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Abstract
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant
under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that
can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we
observe the following:
• Even the weakest notion of individual rationality restricts the set
of solutions to be equilibria. This observation holds for all types
of solutions: in pure-strategies, in mixed strategies, and in cor-
related strategies where the corresponding notions of equilibria
are pure-Nash, Nash and coarse-correlated.
An action profile is (strict) simultaneous maximizer if it simultane-
ously globally (strictly) maximizes the payoffs of all players.
• If we require that a simultaneous maximizer (if it exists) will
be a solution, then the solution contains the set of pure Nash
equilibria.
• There is no solution for which a strict simultaneous maximizer
(if it exists) is the unique solution.
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1 Introduction
A solution of a strategic interaction suggests a subset of behaviors as possible
behaviors in the interaction. The central solutions of strategic interactions
are Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria which are defined to be the set of
all behaviors where no player can gain by a unilateral deviation. Equilibrium
behaviors have well known and well studied undesirable properties: non-
uniqueness, inefficiency, the underlying assumption that each player knows
opponents’ behavior, and others... This motivates the search for a ”better”
solution which overcomes part of the undesirable properties. This issue was
addressed in areas as equilibrium selection (see [Harsanyi and Selten, 1988])
and learning dynamics (see [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2013]). Alternative solu-
tions was suggested: risk-dominant equilibrium (see [Harsanyi and Selten,
1988]), scholastically stable equilibrium (see [Young, 1993]), minimal curb
(see [Basu and Weibull, 1991]), sink equilibrium (see [Goemans et al., 2005])
and many others.
This note suggests reasonable basic properties of a solution (axioms). We
show that these basic properties characterize the classical notions of Nash
equilibrium and correlated equilibrium; In other words, these equilibria are
the only possible solutions that satisfies these basic properties.
The axioms that are considered in this note are the following:
• Strategic equivalence (SE), which requires that the set of solutions of
two strategically equivalent games will be identical.
• Individual rationality (IR). We consider the weakest notion of individ-
ual rationality that requires that in a solution, every player receives a
payoff that is above the payoff that he can guarantee by pure actions.
• Simultaneous maximizer (SM), which requires that if there exists an
action profile where all players receive their best possible payoff, then
this action profile will be a possible solution.
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• Unique Simultaneous maximizer (USM), which requires that if there
exists an action profile where all players receive strictly their best pos-
sible payoff, then this action profile will be a unique solution.
Our main observations are the following:
1. Every solution that satisfies (SE) and (IR) is a subset of pure Nash/
Nash/ coarse-correlated equilibria, depending on the type of allowed be-
haviors, pure/ mixed/ correlated strategies correspondingly (Corollary
1 and Proposition 5). This observation demonstrates how unreasonable
could a non-equilibrium solution be (from the perspective of at least
one player) if the solution is invariant under strategic equivalence.
2. Every solution that satisfies (SE) and (SM) contains the set of pure
Nash equilibia (Propositions 3 and 6). A consequence of this obser-
vation is that any equilibrium selection that satisfies strategic equiva-
lence1 will be inefficient in cases where efficiency seems reasonable (i.e.,
cases of existence of simultaneous maximazer).
3. By combining observations (1) and (2) we obtain that pure Nash equi-
librium is the unique solution that satisfies axioms (SE), (IR), and (SM)
(see Corollaries 2 and 3), which provides a simple axiomatization for
pure Nash equilibrium.
4. There is no solution that satisfies (SE) and (USM) (Corollaries 2 and
3). This observation demonstrates the difficulty in selecting the efficient
equilibrium, even in cases where this selection seems reasonable (i.e.,
cases of existence of strict simultaneous maximazer). This difficulty was
demonstrated also in [Aumann and Sorin, 1989], where they essentially
shows that such selection can be done in two player games, but the
selecting mechanism is involved.
1Indeed most of studied models of of equilibrium selections satisfy strategic equivalence.
For instance risk-dominance or stochastic stability.
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Axiomatic approach to Nash equilibrium was addressed previously in
Norde et al. [Norde et al., 1996], where they also obtain an axiomatization for
pure Nash equilibrium (as we do in Corollaries 2 and 3). The central axiom
in [Norde et al., 1996] is consistency that was presented in [Peleg and Tijs,
1996] and [Peleg et al., 1996]. Consistency requires that if a subset of players
P act according to a solution s, then in the game between the players that
are not in P acting according to s remains a solution. The nature of this
axiom is to maintain the payoffs in the game and to require invariance of
the solution under a proper change of the structure of the game. Note also
that the consistency axiom, by its nature, cannot be defined for correlated
behaviors. In the present note the central axiom is strategic equivalence
which has the opposite nature: we maintain the structure of the game and
require invariance of the solution under a proper change of the payoffs. Our
axioms are well defined for correlated strategies and indeed Propositions 1
and 2 proves axiomatic characterization for correlated and coarse-correlated
equilibria. Axiomatic approach to equilibrium with consistency as a central
axiom was discussed also in [Voorneveld et al., 1999] where they consider
games with vector-payoffs, in [van Heumen et al., 1996] where they consider
Bayesian games, and in [Voorneveld et al., 2005] where they obtain axioma-
tization for minimal curbs.
2 Preliminaries
We use standard notation of a normal form game. The set of players is [n].
The set of actions of player i is denoted by Ai, and A = ×i∈[n]Ai denotes
the action profiles set. The set of probability distributions over a set B is
denoted by ∆(B). The payoff function of player i is denoted by ui : A→ R,
and it is miltylinearily extended to ui : ∆(A) → R. We will identify the
game with its payoff profile u = (ui)i∈[n]. The set of all games with action
profiles set A is denoted by Γ(A).
For a distribution x ∈ ∆(A) we denote by xi ∈ ∆(Ai) and x−i ∈ ∆(A−i)
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the marginal distributions over the elements Ai and A−i correspondingly. For
an action bi ∈ Ai we denote by x|bi ∈ ∆(A−i) the conditional distribution of
x over A−i given the event {a : ai = bi}. The notion x|bi is well defined only
if the event {a : ai = bi} has positive probability (i.e., if xi(bi) > 0).
For two game u, v with the same actions set the game u+ v is defined by
(u+ v)(a) = u(a) + v(a).
We denote by z(c, i, b−i) the following game,
(z(c, i, b−i))j(a) =


c if j = i and a−i = b−i
0 otherwise.
(1)
where player i receives a payoff of c iff his opponents play b−i.
The set of possible behaviors in a game with an actions set A is denoted by
B = B(A) and it may vary upon the model we consider. We can consider pure
strategies behaviors (B = A), mixed strategies behaviors (B = ×i∈[n]∆Ai),
or correlated strategies behaviors (B = ∆(A)).
A solution of a game is a mapping S : Γ(A) ։ B(A), which maps every
game into a set of possible solutions. For every solution we should specify
the type of behaviors it produces (pure, mixed, or correlated). We will not
specify the type of behaviors in cases where the statement holds for all tree
types of behavior.
The central solutions of normal form games are: pure Nash equilibrium,
Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium and coarse-correlated equilibrium.
Pure Nash equilibrium is a pure-strategies solution that is defined by:
PNE(u) = {a ∈ A : ui(a) ≥ ui(bi, a−i) for all i ∈ [n] and all bi ∈ Ai}.
Nash equilibrium is a mixed-strategies solution that is defined by:
NE(u) = {x ∈ ×j∈[n]∆(Aj) : ui(x) ≥ ui(bi, x−i) for all i ∈ [n] and all bi ∈ Ai}.
Correlated equilibrium is a correlated-strategies solution that is defined by:
CE(u) = {x ∈ ∆(A) : ui(ai, x|ai) ≥ ui(bi, x|ai) for all i ∈ [n],
all ai s.t. xi(ai) > 0, and all bi ∈ Ai}.
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Coarse-correlated equilibrium is a correlated-strategies solution that is de-
fined by:
CCE(u) = {x ∈ ∆(A) : ui(x) ≥ ui(bi, x|ai) for all i ∈ [n] and all bi ∈ Ai}.
A farther discussion on the behavior-model difference between correlated
equilibrium and coarse-correlated equilibrium appears in Section 3.1.1.
Our central axiom for a solution is invariance under strategic equivalence.
Axiom 1. Strategic Equivalence (SE): S(u) = S(u+z(c, i, b−i)) for every
u, c, i and b−i.
The rational behind the axiom is as follows. In the game u + z(c, i, b−i)
whether or not player i receives an additional payoff of c does not depend on
the behavior of players i. Therefore, if x ∈ S(u) is a reasonable behavior in
the game u (i.e., a solution), so it should be for the game u+ z(c, i, b−i).
3 Finite actions sets
3.1 Restriction to Equilibrium Behaviors
We define the pure individually rational value of player i to be
piri(u) := max
ai∈Ai
(
min
a−i∈A−i
ui(ai, a−i)
)
.
Note that player i can guarantee a payoff of at least piri by playing a pure
strategy irrespective of the strategy of his opponents. Therefore it is reason-
able to assume that every player will get a payoff of at least piri in a solution
of the game:
Axiom 2. Pure Individual Rationality (PIR): ui(x) > piri(u) for every
x ∈ S(u) and every player i.
The rational behind axiom (PIR) relies on a deviation argument: if
player i receives a payoff below piri then he will prefer to deviate to a pure
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strategy that guarantees him at least piri. We emphasize that the above
deviation argument is significantly weaker than the deviation argument in
the definition of equilibrium, because in an equilibrium player i should also
know the strategy of his opponents.
There are other notions of individual-rationality: individual rationality in
mixed strategies where the opponents are not allowed to correlate their pun-
ishment strategies (i.e., iri(u) := maxxi∈∆(Ai)minx−i∈×j 6=i∆(Aj) ui(xi, x−i)),
and individual-rationality where we allow to the opponents to correlate their
punishment strategy (i.e., ciri(u) := maxxi∈∆(Ai) minx−i∈∆(A−i) ui(xi, x−i)).
Depending on the type of solution (in pure, mixed or correlated strategies)
each one of the individually rational levels might be a reasonable axiom for
the solution. However, the pure individual-rationality axiom is the weakest
axiom among the three, and we will see that even this weakest axiom is
sufficient to eliminate all the non-equilibria behaviors in all three cases of
behavior (pure, mixed, and correlated).
We would like to treat to all the cases of behavior in a single statement. In
order to do so, we consider the property that defines the notion of equilibrium
in all cases:
Property. No Unilateral Deviation Improvement (NUDI): ui(x) ≥
ui(ai, x−i) for every x ∈ S(u), every i ∈ [n], and every ai ∈ Ai.
For the case of pure-strategy behaviors, (NUDI) defines the set of pure
Nash equilibria. For the case of mixed-strategy behaviors, (NUDI) defines
the set of mixed Nash equilibria. For the case of correlated-strategy behaviors
(NUDI), defines the set of coarse-correlated equilibria.
The following proposition states that the weak axiom (PIR) is sufficient
for eliminating all the non-equilibrium behaviors.
Proposition 1. Every solution S that satisfies axioms (SE) and (PIR)
satisfies also property (NUDI).
Straightforward corollary from the proposition is the following.
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Corollary 1. If a pure-strategies/ mixed strategies/ correlated-strategies
solution S satisfies axioms (SE) and (PIR), then S(u) ⊆ PNE(u)/ S(u) ⊆
NE(u)/ S(u) ⊆ CCE(u) (correspondingly).
A consequence of the corollary is that any solution that for some games
contains non-equilibrium behaviors, must violate either strategic equivalence
or the pure individual rationality.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let S be a solution that satisfies (SE) and (PIR)
and assume that a behavior x does not satisfy the condition of (NUDI),
which means that there exists player i and action ai such that ui(ai, x−i) >
ui(x), we show that x /∈ S(u). We construct a strategically equivalent game
v, where we set all payoffs of player i when he plays ai to be 0. We define
the game v by
v = u+
∑
b−i∈A−i
z(−ui(ai, b−i), i, b−i).
It easy to see that indeed v(ai, b−i) = 0 for all b−i ∈ A−i, therefore piri(v) ≥ 0.
On the other hand note that
v(x) = u(x)− u(ai, x−i) < 0
because the payoff of player i in the game
∑
b−i
z(−ui(ai, b−i), i, b−i) when his
opponents are playing x−i is equal to −u(ai, x−i). Therefore by the (PIR)
axiom we get x /∈ S(v) and by the (SE) axiom we get S(v) = S(u).
3.1.1 Correlated equilibrium
Once we allow correlated strategies behavior we have to assume existence of
a correlation device. One of the suggested models for a correlation device
(and probably the most central one) assumes existence of a mediator. The
mediator randomizes an action profile a according to a correlated distribution
x ∈ ∆(A) and then recommends to each player i his action ai. There are two
reasonable models of correlated behavior.
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1. Each player i does not observe the recommendation of the mediator at
the moment when he decides about his act. In such a case, possible
acts of player i are ”follow the recommendation” or ”deviate to action
ai”. This is the model that leads to the definition of coarse-correlated
equilibrium.
2. Each player i observes the recommendation of the mediator before he
decides about his action. In such a case possible acts of the player are
”play a′i when the recommendation was ai”. This is the model that
leads to the definition of correlated equilibrium.
In the case of the second model, axiom (PIR) is too weak, because it
does not take into account the additional information that player i has before
making his decision. A reasonable analog of axiom (PIR) in the case of
model (2) is the following.
Axiom 3. Pure Individual Rationality for All Recommendations
(PIRAR): ui(ai, (x|ai)−i) > piri(u) for every i ∈ [n] and every ai such that
xi(ai) > 0.
The axiom states that for every possible recommendation to player i, he
receives an expected payoff of at least piri(u) by following the recommenda-
tion of the mediator. Note that in model (2) player i can decide to deviate
to a pure action that guarantee him piri after he observed the recommenda-
tion ai. Therefore axiom (PIRAR) is indeed reasonable in the model (2) of
correlated behavior.
The analog of Corollary 1 for the case of correlated equilibrium is the
following.
Proposition 2. If a correlated-strategies solution S satisfies axioms (SE)
and (PIRAR), then S(u) ⊆ CE(u).
The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1
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Proof. Let S be a solution that satisfies (SE) and (PIRAR) and assume
that a distribution x ∈ ∆(A) is not a correlated equilibrium, which means
that there exists player i and actions ai, a
′
i such that ui(a
′
i, (x|ai)) > ui(ai, (x|ai)),
we show that x /∈ S(u). We construct a strategically equivalent game v,
where we set all payoffs of player i when he plays a′i to be 0. We define the
game v by
v = u+
∑
b−i∈A−i
z(−ui(a
′
i, b−i), i, b−i).
In the constructed game piri(v) ≥ 0, and on the other hand v(ai, (x|ai)) =
u(ai, (x|ai)) − u(a
′
i, (x|ai)) < 0. Therefore by axioms (PIRAR) and (SE)
we get x /∈ S(v) = S(u).
3.2 Containment of Equilibrium Behaviors
Non of the axioms (SE) or (PIR) requires that part of the behaviors will
belong to the set of solutions. In particular, the unreasonable solution S(u) ≡
∅ satisfies both axioms (SE) and (PIR). There are games where it is not
obvious which behaviors should belong to the set of solutions. But in the
case where there exists an action a that simultaneously maximizes the payoffs
of all players it is reasonable to assume that this action will be a possible
solution.
Axiom 4. Simultaneous Maximizer (SM) If there exists a ∈ A such
that ui(a) ≥ ui(b) for all i ∈ [n] and all b ∈ A, then a ∈ S(u).
Under the strategic equivalence assumption, this basic axiom is sufficient
for including all the pure Nash equilibria as possible solutions.
Proposition 3. If a solution S satisfies axioms (SE) and (SM), then S(u) ⊇
PNE(u) for every u.
A consequence from Proposition 3 is that every pure-Nash-equilibrium
selection (i.e., a refinement of pure Nash equilibria) violates either strategic
equivalence or the simultaneous maximizer axiom.
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By combining Proposition 1 and 3 we obtain an exact axiomatic charac-
terization of pure Nash equilibria.
Corollary 2. Pure Nash equilibrium is the unique pure-strategies solution
that satisfies axioms (SE),(SM), and (PIR).
Proof of Proposition 3. Let S be a solution that satisfies axioms (SE) and
(SM), let a ∈ PNE(u), and let L be a bound on the payoffs of u (i.e.,
|ui(a)| < L). We construct a strategically equivalent game v, where we
increase by a lot the payoffs of all players at the action profile a. We define
the game v by
v = u+
∑
i∈[n]
z(2L, i, a−i).
The action profile a in the game v is a simultaneous maximizer for all players,
because for every b ∈ A and every i ∈ [n] we have
vi(a) = ui(a) + 2L ≥ ui(b) + 2L = vi(b) for b s.t. b−i = a−i
vi(a) = ui(a) + 2L ≥ L ≥ ui(b) = vi(b) for b s.t. b−i 6= a−i.
By axiom (SM) we have a ∈ S(v) and by axiom (SE) we S(v) = S(a).
A desirable property of a solution is uniqueness. Obviously it is unrea-
sonable to assume that the solution will be unique for all games (e.g., in the
game where all playoffs are 0, it is reasonable to allow all behaviors). But
games that contain an action profile that simultaneously strictly maximizes
the payoffs of all players it is reasonable to desire that this maximizer will
be the unique solution.
Axiom 5. Unique Simultaneous Maximizer (USM): If there exists
a ∈ A such that ui(a) > ui(b) for all i ∈ [n] and all b 6= a, then S(u) = {a}.
Under the strategic equivalence assumption, the desirable property (USM)
is unachievable.
Proposition 4. There is no solution S that satisfies axioms (SE) and
(USM).
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Proof of Proposition 4. Assume by a contrary that such a solution exists.
Take any game u with payoffs bounded by [−1, 1] and with at least two strict
pure Nash equilibria a and a′. Consider the game v = u +
∑
i z(3, i, a−i).
By similar arguments to those in the proof of Proposition 3 we obtain that
a is a unique strict maximizer. By axioms (SE) and (USM) we obtain
S(u) = S(v) = {a}. By repeating the same arguments for the strict pure
Nash equilibrium a′ we obtain S(u) = {a′}, which is a contradiction.
4 Continuum Action Sets
Corollary 2 provides an exact axiomatic characterization of pure Nash equi-
libria. However, for the case of finite actions sets, pure Nash equilibria is a
problematic solution because it might be empty. On the other hand, for the
case where the action set of each player is a compact convex set, the payoffs
are continuous, and the payoff of each player is convex (with respect to his
own action), pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist (see [Glicksberg,
1951]). In this section we show that the results of section 3 can be extended
to the above mentioned settings.
We use the same notations as in section 3. Now, Ai is a compact convex
set, the payoff function ui : Ai × A−i → R is continuous, and ui(·, a−i) is
a convex function of ai for every a−i. In this section we will consider only
pure-strategies behaviors (i.e., S : Γ(A)։ A).
Note that we cannot use the same axiom (SE) for invariance under strate-
gic equivalence, because in the new game u+ z(c, i, b−i) the payoff of player
i is no longer continuous for c 6= 0. The analog of axiom (SE) for the case
of continuous payoffs is defined as follows:
For a function f : A−i → R we denote by z(i, f) the game where player’s i
payoff is (z(i, f))(a) = f(a−i) (irrespective of his own action), and the payoffs
of all players j 6= i is always 0.
Axiom 6. Continuous Strategic Equivalence (CSE): For every game
u, every player i ∈ [n], and every continuous function f : A−i → R holds
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S(u) = S(u+ z(i, f)).
Note that the game u+ z(i, f) belong to the class of the discussed games:
the payoffs are continuous (because f is continuous, and the payoffs (u +
z(i, f))i(·, a−i) are convex because convexity is preserved under an addition
of a constant.
The rational behind the axiom is exactly the same as for (SE). The
additional payoff of f(a−i) that player i receives does not depend on his own
action.
The analog of Corollary 2 is the following:
Proposition 5. If a pure-strategy solution S satisfies axioms (CSE) and
(PIR), then S(u) ⊆ PNE(u).
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. For an action profile a /∈ PNE(u) there exists a player i and an action
bi such that ui(bi, a−i) > ui(a). We define the function f : A−i → R by
f(a−i) = −u(bi, a−i) (note that f is continuous because u is continuous), and
we consider the game v = u + z(i, f). In the game v we have vi(bi, a−i) = 0
for all a−i ∈ A−i, and therefore piri(v) ≥ 0. On the other hand, v(a) =
u(a) − u(bi, a−i). By the (PIR) axiom a /∈ S(v), and by the (CSE) axiom
S(v) = S(u).
The analog of Proposition 3 is the following:
Proposition 6. If a pure-strategy solution S satisfies axioms (CSE) and
(SM), then S(u) ⊇ PNE(u).
Here we cannot follow the ideas of the proof of Proposition 3 directly,
because the (CSE) axiom requires that the strategic equivalence transfor-
mation will be continuous.
Proof. Let a ∈ PNE(u). For every player i ∈ [n] we define a function
fi : A−i → R by fi(a−i) = −maxai∈Ai u(ai, a−i), note that fi is continuous be-
cause the maximum of continuous functions is continuous. Now we consider
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the game v = u+
∑
i∈[n] z(i, fi). In the game v all the payoffs are weakly neg-
ative because vi(b) = ui(b)−maxai∈Ai u(ai, b−i) ≤ 0. Moreover, the payoffs at
the action profile a are equal to 0 because vi(a) = ui(a)−maxai∈Ai u(ai, a−i) =
0. Therefore a is simultaneous maximizer, so a ∈ S(v) = S(u).
By combining Propositions 5 and 6 we obtain an exact characterization
of pure Nash equilibria in continuous convex games (where pure Nash equi-
librium is guaranteed to exist):
Corollary 3. Pure Nash equilibria is the unique solution that satisfies ax-
ioms (CSE),(PIR), and (SM).
The impossibility result of Proposition 4 also can be extended to the case
of continuous games:
Proposition 7. There is no solution that satisfies axioms (CSE) and (USM).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4 we start with a continuous game
u that contain at least two strict pure Nash equilibria a and a′, and we
construct a strategically equivalent game where a is a strict simultaneous
maximizer. In order to do so we use the constructed game v in the proof of
Proposition 6. The action profile a is a weak simultaneous maximizer in the
game v, but we easily can define a new strategically equivalent game v′ where
a will be a strict simultaneous maximizer: we define gi : A−i → R to be any
continuous function with unique global maximum at a−i that is equal to 0
(for instance, gi(a−i) = −||a−i − a−i||2), and we define v
′ = v +
∑
i z(i, gi).
Note that in the game v′ we have v′i(a) = 0 for all the players. In addition,
for a such that a−i = a−i we have v
′
i(a) < v
′
i(a) because a is a strict pure
Nash equilibrium, and for a such that a−i 6= a−i we have v
′
i(a) < vi(a) ≤ 0.
Therefore for every a 6= a and every player i we have v′i(a) < 0. Hence, a
is indeed a strict simultaneous maxinizer. By axioms (USM) and (CSE)
we have {a} = S(v′) = S(v) = S(u), but we can repeat the same arguments
for the strict pure Nash equilibrium a′ and obtain {a′} = S(u), which is a
contradiction.
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